

We are of opinion the appeal in both cases should be allowed, and judgment entered in the terms to be stated by the Chief Justice.

Appeals allowed. Judgments appealed from set aside. In the action against the Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co. judgment entered for the plaintiff for £363. In the action against the Yorkshire Insurance Co. judgment entered for the plaintiff for £210. Defendants to pay to the plaintiff his general costs of the actions. Plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs exclusively occasioned by the issues on which the plaintiff failed. Respondents to pay costs of appeal to the High Court.

[Solicitors—For the appellant, W. S. Doria; for the respondents, Hodgson and Finlayson.]

S. E. H.

Engineer's Case 28 C.C.R. 129
FULL COURT — (Knox, C.J.,
Isaacs, Higgins, Gavan Duffy,
Rich and Starke, J.J.) } July 26-30; Aug.
 (Sydney.) } 2, 31.

**AMALGAMATED SOCIETY OF ENGINEERS v.
ADELAIDE STEAMSHIP CO. LTD.
and Others.**

(THE STATES INDUSTRIES CASE.)

Constitutional law—Conciliation and arbitration—State carrying on trading and industrial operations—Constitutional power of Commonwealth Parliament to bind States—How far State can be party to “industrial disputes” — The rule in D’Egmond v. Pedder—Supremacy of Commonwealth law—Previous decisions reviewed—The Constitution, sec. 51 (XXXV.).

An alleged industrial dispute was submitted to the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration by plaintiff. The dispute was alleged to be between a union of engineers and the Adelaide Steamship Co. Limited and numerous others, including the Minister for Trading Concerns (W.A.). A Justice of the High Court was prepared to find that an industrial dispute in fact existed between the union and the respondents, including the Minister for Trading Concerns, who carried on trading operations, which if carried on by private employers could give rise in fact to "industrial disputes" within the meaning of section 51 (xxxv.) of the Constitution. The Minister in fact represented the State of Western Australia, and questions arose as to whether that State could be bound by any law of the Commonwealth Parliament with respect to conciliation and arbitration under section 51, placitum (xxxv.), of the Constitution, and if so, whether a State engaging in trading and industrial concerns could be a party to an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of that placitum. On a case stated submitting these questions for determination,

Held, per Knox, C.J., Isaacs, Higgins, Rich and Starke, J.J. (Gavan Duffy, J., dissentiente).—1. That the Commonwealth Parliament has power to make laws binding on the States with respect to conciliation and arbitration

for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of one State.

2. That the dispute found to exist in fact between the claimants and the Minister for Trading Concerns (W.A.) was an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of section 51 (xxxv.) of the Constitution, notwithstanding that the Minister represented the State of Western Australia.

The doctrines of "political necessity" and of "implied prohibition" are not to be applied in construing the Constitution.

The extent to which the Crown, considered in relation to the Empire, the Commonwealth or the States, is bound by any law within the granted authority of the Parliament, depends on the indication which the law gives of intention to bind the Crown.

Per Higgins, J.—The rule that the Crown is not bound by an Act unless by express words or necessary implication applies, not to a Constitution, but to the Acts made by the Parliament under the powers of the Constitution.

The decision in *D'Emden v. Pedder*, 1 C.L.R. 91, rests on the supremacy of Commonwealth law under section 109 of the Constitution, and is sound. Any observation in it that can be regarded as favouring a reciprocal doctrine creating invalidity of Commonwealth legislation by reason of State Constitution or legislation, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is overruled.

The decisions in *Deakin v. Webb* and *Deakin v. Lyne*, 10 A.L.R. 237, and in *Barter's Case*, 13 A.L.R. 313, rest on the same principle of supremacy, and not on the ground that the mere taxing of a Federal officer in common with the rest of the community is an interference with the means employed by the Commonwealth for the performance of its constitutional functions.

The Railway Servants' Case, 13 A.L.R. 273, is irreconcilable with the *Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Collector of Customs*, 14 A.L.R. 516, and is overruled.

CASE STATED.

This was a case stated by Higgins, J., the President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, for the opinion of the Full High Court on questions of law arising in the hearing before him of a summons under sec. 21AA of the "Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act."

The case (as amended) was as follows:—

1. An alleged industrial dispute has been submitted to the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration by plaint.

2. The industrial dispute is alleged to exist between the Amalgamated Society of Engineers as claimant and the Adelaide Steamship Company Limited and 843 others in all parts of Australia, including the Minister for Trading Concerns, Western Australia, the State Implement and Engineering Works, North Fremantle, and the State Sawmills, D. Humphries, Perth.

3. An application has been made to me as a Justice of the High Court, sitting in Chambers, for a decision on the question whether the dispute or any part thereof exists or is threatened, impending, or probable, as an industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State between the said parties.

4. The said Minister for Trading Concerns and the State Implement and Engineering Works and the

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State Sawmills object that there can be no industrial dispute found to exist as between the claimant and themselves as Governmental concerns.

5. The evidence has closed, and I have found that an industrial dispute exists as alleged as to most of the other respondents, but I have reserved my decision as to the respondents mentioned in paragraph 4.

6. Subject to the objection aforesaid, I am prepared to find on the evidence that there is in fact an industrial dispute existing within the meaning of the Act as between the claimant and the said respondents, as well as the other respondents, on the subjects of the plaint.

7. The State Implement and Engineering Works and the State Sawmills were established by the Government of Western Australia, and are regulated by the Western Australian Acts, the "Government Trading Concerns Act 1912" and the "Trading Concerns Act 1916."

8. The State Implement and Engineering Works undertake for the public, as well as for the various State departments, the work of making and repairing agricultural implements, and engines, troughs, wind-mills, &c. They also undertake for private steamship-owners, as well as for steamers owned by the State, repairs to ships and to shipping machinery. They advertise their operations in competition with private undertakings in newspapers and by circulars, have showrooms in Perth, and have selling agents throughout the State.

9. The State sawmills cut and mill timber, and sell the product in competition with other millowners to the public, and carry out sawmills work for the public as well as for the State departments.

10. The clerical staff of the State Implement and Engineering Works and of the State Sawmills are appointed and hold office under the W.A. "Public Service Act," but the other employees (including members of the claimant union) have no statutory public service rights by reason of their engagement. The manager and superintendent of the State Sawmills hold office under a special agreement.

11 (as amended). A copy of the plaint is annexed hereto, and copies of newspapers with the advertisements to the public, and copies of the circulars, will be produced if required.

I direct the following questions to be argued before the Full Court:—

1. Has the Parliament of the Commonwealth power to make laws binding on the States with respect to conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of one State?
2. Is the dispute which has been found to exist in fact between the claimants and the Minister for Trading Concerns (W.A.) an industrial dispute within the meaning of sec. 51 (xxxv.) of the Constitution?

It was directed that the case be heard before the Full Bench, and the Commonwealth and all the States were given leave to intervene.

Menzies for the claimants.

Ham for the Minister for Trading Concerns, W.A.

Sir Edward Mitchell, K.C., and *Latham* for the States of Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania (intervening).

Flannery, K.C., and *Evatt* for the State of New South Wales (intervening).

Leverrier, K.C., and *H. E. Manning* for the Commonwealth (intervening).

The following cases were cited during argument:—*McCulloch v. Maryland*, 4 Wheat. 316, at 425, 432; *Collector v. Day*, 11 Wall. 113, at 128; *Municipalities Case*, 25 A.L.R. 309; *D'Emden v. Pedder*, 1 C.L.R. 91; *R. v. Burah*, 3 A.C. 889, at 904; *Baxter v. Commissioner of Taxation*, 13 A.L.R. 313; *Troy v. Wrigglesworth*, 25 A.L.R. 196; *R. v. Sutton*, 14 A.L.R. 505; *Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Collector of Customs, New South Wales*, 14 A.L.R. 516; *Wollaston's Case*, 8 A.L.R. 188; *Coomber v. Justices of Berks.*, 9 A.C. 61, at 72, 74; *South Carolina v. United States*, 199 U.S. 437; *Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co.*, 17 A.L.R. 285; *Australian Workers' Union v. Adelaide Milling Co.*, 25 A.L.R. 243; *Railway Servants Case*, 13 A.L.R. 273; *Attorney-General of Queensland v. Attorney-General of Commonwealth (The Land Tax Case)*, 21 A.L.R. 221; *Farey v. Burvett*, 22 A.L.R. 201; *Liquidators of Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick*, (1892) A.C. 437, at 441; *Pinnington v. Galland*, 9 Exc. 1; *Richards v. Rose*, 9 Ex. 218; *Deakin and Lyne v. Webb*, 10 A.L.R. 237; *Commonwealth v. New South Wales*, 12 A.L.R. 541; *Vearie Bank v. Fenno*, 8 Wall. 533, at 547, 556; *Attorney-General of the Commonwealth v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co.*, (1914) A.C. 237, at 252; *Australian Agricultural Co. v. Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia*, 19 A.L.R. 509; *Tramways Case (No. 1)*, 20 A.L.R. 470; *Broom and Hadley's Commentaries*, vol. I., p. 289; *Dunn v. The Queen*, (1896) 1 Q.B. 116; *Sawmillers' Case*, 15 A.L.R. 375; *Whybrow's Case*, 16 A.L.R. 185; *Attorney-General v. Constable*, 4 Ex. D. 172; *Manor of Lowestaff v. Great Eastern Railway*, 24 Ch. D. 253; *Lefroy's Legislative Powers in Canada*, page 582; *Attorney-General of Ontario v. Mercer*, 8 A.C. 767; *St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen*, 14 A.C. 46, at 59; *Lefroy's Constitutional Law of Canada*, p. 187; *Lefroy's Canada's Federal System*, pp. 150, 197; *Valin v. Langlon*, 5 A.C. 115; *Virginia v. West Virginia*, 246 U.S. 565, at 596; *Attorney-General of Ontario v. Attorney-General of Canada*, (1896) A.C. 348; *Cushing v. Duprey*, 5 A.C. 4099, at 415; *R. v. Governor of South Australia*, 14 A.L.R. 98; *Anson's Law and Custom of the Constitution* (3rd ed.), vol. II., p. 168; *Young v. s.s. Scotia*, (1903)

A.C. 501; *The King v. Inspector of Penal Establishments, Ex parte Horwitz*, 14 A.L.R. 342.

Cur. adv. vult.

ISAACS, J., delivered the judgment of himself, KNOX, C.J., RICH and STARKE, JJ.:—Case stated under the "Judiciary Act," sec. 18, for the consideration of the Full Court, on the hearing of a summons under sec. 21AA of the "Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act."

The Amalgamated Society of Engineers is claimant in a plaint under the last-mentioned Act. There are 844 respondents in various parts of Australia. Among the respondents are the Minister for Trading Concerns, Western Australia, the State Implement and Engineering Works, North Fremantle, and the State Sawmills, D. Humphries, Perth. The Western Australian Trading Concerns Acts of 1912 and 1916, as was conceded in argument, leave no doubt of two facts—(1) That these respondents carry on trading operations which in point of fact could give rise to "industrial disputes" within the meaning of pl. (xxxv.) of sec. 51 of the Constitution, if the respondents were private employers; and (2) that these respondents are not private employers, but represent the State of Western Australia. The case in effect states that in fact and within the meaning of the "Conciliation and Arbitration Act," an industrial dispute exists to which these respondents are parties, unless, upon the true interpretation of the Constitution, no such dispute can be found to exist between Government trading concerns and their employees in such concerns. The questions for the determination of this Court are as follow:—(1) . . . Has the Parliament of the Commonwealth power to make laws binding on the States with respect to conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of one State? (2) . . . As to each of the respondents named in the Special Case—Is the dispute which has been found to exist in fact between the claimants and the Minister for Trading Concerns (W.A.) an industrial dispute within the meaning of sec. 51 (xxxv.)?

The Commonwealth and the States of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria, have, by leave, intervened, so that all possible interests are fully represented. Queensland was given leave to intervene, but has not thought necessary to do so. The question presented is of the highest importance to the people of Australia, grouped nationally or sectionally, and it has necessitated a survey, not merely of the Constitution itself, but also of many of the decisions of this Court on various points, more or less closely related to the question we have directly to determine. The more the decisions are examined and compared with each other, and with the Constitution itself, the more evident it becomes that no clear principle can account for them. They are sometimes at variance with the natural meaning of the

text of the Constitution; some are irreconcilable with others, and some are individually rested on reasons not founded on the words of the Constitution, or any recognised principle of the Common Law underlying the expressed terms of the Constitution, but on implication drawn from what is called the principle of "necessity," that being itself referable to no more definite standard than the personal opinion of the Judge who declares it. To attempt to deduce any consistent rule from them has not only failed, but has disclosed an increasing entanglement and uncertainty, and a conflict, both with the text of the Constitution and with distinct and clear declarations of law by the Privy Council.

It is therefore, in the circumstances, the manifest duty of this Court to turn its earnest attention to the provisions of the Constitution itself. That instrument is the political compact of the whole of the people of Australia, enacted into binding law by the Imperial Parliament, and it is the chief and special duty of this Court faithfully to expound and give effect to it, according to its own terms, finding the intention from the words of the compact, and upholding it throughout, precisely as framed. In doing this, we follow, not merely previous instances in this Court, and other Courts in Australia, but also the precedent of the Privy Council in *Read v. Bishop of Lincoln*, (1892) A.C. 644, at page 655, where the Lord Chancellor, speaking for the Judicial Committee in relation to reviewing its own prior decisions, said—"Whilst fully sensible of the weight to be attached to such decisions, their Lordships are at the same time bound to examine the reasons upon which the decisions rest, and to give effect to their own view of the law." The grounds upon which the Privy Council came to that conclusion we refer to, but need not repeat, adding, however, that as the Commonwealth and State Parliaments and Executives are themselves bound by the declarations of this Court as to their powers *inter se*, our responsibility is so much the greater to give the true effect to the relevant constitutional provisions. In doing this, to use the language of Lord Macnaghten in *Vacher and Sons Limited v. London Society of Compositors*, (1913) A.C. 107, at page 118—"A judicial tribunal has nothing to do with the policy of any Act which it may be called upon to interpret. That may be a matter for private judgment. The duty of the Court, and its only duty, is to expound the language of the Act in accordance with the settled rules of construction." It is proper at the outset to observe that this case does not involve any prerogative "in the sense of the word," to use the phrase employed by the Privy Council in *Theodore v. Duncan*, (1919) A.C. at p. 706, "in which it signifies the power of the Crown apart from statutory authority." Though much of the argument addressed to us on behalf of the States rested on the prerogative, this

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distinction was not observed, but it exists, and so far as concerns prerogative in the sense indicated, it is unnecessary to consider it.

In several recent cases the Judicial Committee have had the broader question under consideration, as in *Canadian Pacific Railway v. Toronto Corporation*, (1911) A.C. at p. 462; and *Bonanza Creek Gold-Mining Co. v. Rex*, (1916) 1 A.C. 565; but in none of these was it found necessary to determine it. It is manifest that when such a question is involved in a decision, the nature of the prerogative, its relation to the Government concerned, and its connection with the power under which it is sought to be affected, may all have to be considered.

In the *Bonanza Creek Case*, (1916) 1 A.C. at p. 587, Lord Haldane, speaking for the Privy Council, and after favouring an interpretation of the "British North America Act," by which certain rights and privileges of the Crown would be reserved from Canadian legislative power, proceeded to say—"It is quite consistent with it to hold that executive power is in any situations which may arise under the Statutory Constitution of Canada conferred by implication in the grant of legislative power, so that where such situations arise the two kinds of authority are correlative. It follows that to this extent the Crown is bound and the prerogative affected." In this case we have to consider the effect of certain statutory authority of States, but in relation to pl. (xxxv.) only, and it is necessary to insert a word of caution.

If in any future case, concerning the prerogative in the broader sense, or arising under some other Commonwealth power—for instance, taxation—the extent of that power should come under consideration so as to involve the effect of the principle stated in the passage just quoted from the *Bonanza Creek Case*, and its application to the prerogative, or to the legislative or executive power of the States in relation to the specific Commonwealth power concerned, the special nature of the power may have to be taken into account. That this must be so is patent from the circumstances that the legislative powers given to the Commonwealth Parliament are all prefaced with one general express limitation, namely, "subject to this Constitution," and consequently those words, which have to be applied *seriatim* to each placitum, require the Court to consider with respect to each separate placitum, over and beyond the general fundamental considerations applying to all the placita, whether there is anything in the Constitution which falls within the express limitation referred to in the governing words of sec. 51. That inquiry, however, must proceed consistently with the principles upon which we determine this case, for they apply generally to all powers contained in that section. The chief contention, on the part of the States, is that what has been called the rule of *D'Emden v. Pedder*, 1 C.L.R. p. 91, justifies their immunity from Com-

monwealth control of State trading. The rule referred to is in these terms (p. 111)—"When a State attempts to give to its legislative or executive authority an operation which, if valid, would fetter, control, or interfere with, the free exercise of the legislative or executive power of the Commonwealth, the attempt, unless expressly authorised by the Constitution, is to that extent invalid and inoperative." So far from that rule supporting the position taken up on behalf of the States, its language strictly applied, is destructive of it. An authority has been set up by a State which is claimed to be an executive authority, and which if exempt from Commonwealth legislation, does fetter or interfere with free exercise of the legislative power of the Commonwealth under pl. (xxxv.) of sec. 51, unless that placitum is not as complete as its words in their natural meaning indicate, or, since sec. 107 applies to State concurrent powers equally with its exclusive powers, unless every Commonwealth legislative power, however complete in itself, is subject to the unrestricted operation of every State Act. It is said that the rule above stated must be read as reciprocal, because some of the reasoning in *D'Emden v. Pedder*, 1 C.L.R. p. 91, indicates a reciprocal invalidity of Commonwealth law where the State is concerned. It is somewhat difficult to extract such a statement from the judgment; it would be *obiter* if found. It is said, however, that the later cases regard *D'Emden v. Pedder* as supporting that view, and ultimately the doctrine of mutual non-interference finds its most distinct formulation in *Queensland v. Commonwealth*, 21 A.L.R. 221 at p. 224. There Griffith, C.J., assuming the implication of non-interference to arise *prima facie* from necessity in all cases, and then to be subject to exclusion where the necessity ended, proceeded to say—"It is manifest that, since the rule is founded upon the necessity of the implication, the implication is excluded if it appears upon consideration of the whole Constitution that the Commonwealth, or conversely the State, was intended to have the power to do the act the validity of which is impeached." Then how is that intention to be ascertained? The learned Chief Justice proceeds to ascertain it by reference to outside circumstances, not of law or constitutional practice, but of fact, such as the expectations and hopes of persons undefined that Crown lands then leased, would become private property. It is an interpretation of the Constitution depending on an implication, which is formed on a vague, individual conception of the spirit of the compact, which is not the result of interpreting any specific language to be quoted, nor referable to any recognised principle of the Common Law of the Constitution, and which when started, is rebuttable, by an intention of exclusion equally not referable to any language of the instrument, or acknowledge Common Law constitutional principle, but arrived at by the Court on the

opinions of Judges as to hopes and expectations respecting vague external conditions. This method of interpretation cannot, we think, provide any secure foundation for Commonwealth or State action, and must inevitably lead—and in fact has already led—to divergencies and inconsistencies more and more pronounced as the decisions accumulate. Those who rely on American authorities for limiting pl. (xxxv.) in the way suggested, would find, in the celebrated judgment of Marshall, C.J., in *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 9 Wheat., p. 1, two passages militating strongly against their contention. One is at p. 188 in these words—"We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which they are conferred." The other is at p. 196, where, speaking of the commerce power, the learned Chief Justice says—"This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution."

In *Keller v. The United States*, 213 U.S. at p. 146, it is said of the State police power—"That power, like all the other reserved powers of the States, is subordinate to those in terms conferred by the Constitution upon the nation."

Passing to one of the latest American decisions, *Virginia v. West Virginia*, 246 U.S. 565, and particularly at pp. 596 and 603, the pre-eminence of Federal authority within the ambit of the text of the Constitution is maintained with equal clearness and vigour. But we conceive that American authorities, however illustrious the tribunals may be, are not a secure basis on which to build fundamentally with respect to our own Constitution. While in secondary and subsidiary matters they may, and sometimes do, afford considerable light and assistance, they cannot, for reasons we are about to state, be recognised as standards whereby to measure the respective rights of the Commonwealth and States under the Australian Constitution.

For the proper construction of the Australian Constitution, it is essential to bear in mind two cardinal features of our political system, which are interwoven in its texture, and notwithstanding considerable similarity of structural design, including the depositary of the residual powers, radically distinguish it from the American Constitution. Pervading the instrument, they must be taken into account in determining the meaning of its language. One is the common sovereignty of all parts of the British Empire. The other is the principle of responsible government. The combined effect of these features is that the expression "State" and the expression "Commonwealth" comprehend both the strictly legal conception of the King, in right of a designated territory, and the people of that territory considered as a political organism. The indivisibility

of the Crown will be presently considered in its bearing on the specific argument in this case. The general influence of the principle of responsible government in the Constitution may be more appropriately referred to now.

In the words of a distinguished lawyer and statesman, Lord Haldane, when a member of the House of Commons, delivered, on the motion for leave to introduce the bill for the Act we are considering—"The difference between the Constitution which this Bill proposes to set up, and the Constitution of the United States, is enormous and fundamental. This Bill is permeated through and through with the spirit of the greatest institution which exists in the Empire, and which pertains to every Constitution established within the Empire—I mean the institution of responsible government, a government under which the Executive is directly responsible to—nay, is almost the creature of the Legislature. This is not so in America, but it is so with all the Constitutions we have granted to our self-governing Colonies. On this occasion, we establish a Constitution modelled on our own model pregnant with the same spirit, and permeated with the principle of responsible government. Therefore, what you have here is nothing akin to the Constitution of the United States, except in its most superficial features." With these expressions we entirely agree. The recent case of *Commercial Cable Company v. Newfoundland*, (1916) 2 A.C. p. 610, is a landmark in the legal development of the Constitution. There the principle of responsible government was held by the Privy Council to control the question of the Crown's liability on an agreement made by the Governor of Newfoundland. The Elective Chamber, having made a rule—not a law, be it observed—for regulating its own proceedings, requiring certain contracts to be approved by a resolution of the House, it was held that in view of the constitutional practice of the Executive, conforming, under the principle of responsible government, to the requirement of the Elective Chamber, the rule was a restriction on the Governor's power, under his commission, to represent the Crown, and consequently on his power on behalf of the Crown, to contract, which everyone transacting public business with him must be taken to know. The rule was in terms held to have become part of the Constitution of Newfoundland. How far that principle affects the question of executive power, necessarily correlative to legislative power, is indefinite, and does not now fall to be considered.

But it is plain that in view of the two features of common and indivisible sovereignty, and responsible government, no more profound error could be made than to endeavour to find our way through our own Constitution by the borrowed light of the decisions, and sometimes the dicta that American institutions and circumstances have drawn from the distinguished

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tribunals of that country. See, also, the observations of Sir Henry Jenkyns in *British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas*, at p. 90. We therefore look to the judicial authorities which are part of our own development, which have grown up beside our political system, have guided it, have been influenced by it, and are consistent with it, and which, so far as they existed in 1900, we must regard as in the contemplation of those who, whether in the Convention or in the Imperial Parliament, brought our Constitution into being, and so far as they are of later date, we are bound to look to as authoritative for us.

The settled rules of construction which we have to apply have been very distinctly enunciated by the highest tribunals of the Empire. To those we must conform ourselves, for whatever finality the law gives to our decisions on questions like the present, it is as incumbent upon this Court in arriving at its conclusions to adhere to principles so established as it is admittedly incumbent upon the House of Lords or Privy Council in cases arising before those ultimately final tribunals.

What then are the settled rules of construction? The first, and "golden rule" or "universal rule," as it has been variously termed, has been settled in *Grey v. Pearson*, 6 H.L.C., p. 61, at p. 106; and the *Sussex Peerage Case*, 2 Cl. & F., p. 85, at p. 143, in well-known passages which are quoted by Lord Macnaghten in *Vachar's Case*, (1913) A.C., at pp. 117, 118. Lord Chancellor Haldane, in the same case, at p. 113, made some observations very pertinent to the present occasion. His Lordship, after stating that speculation on the motives of the Legislature was a topic which Judges cannot profitably or properly enter upon, said—"Their province is the very different one of construing the language in which the Legislature has finally expressed its conclusions, and if they undertake the other province which belongs to those who, in making the laws, have to endeavour to interpret the desire of the country, they are in danger of going astray in a labyrinth to the character of which they have no sufficient guide. In endeavouring to place the proper interpretation on the sections of the statute before this House sitting in its judicial capacity, I propose, therefore, to exclude consideration of everything excepting the state of the law as it was when the statute was passed, and the light to be got by reading it as a whole, before attempting to construe any particular section. Subject to this consideration, I think that the only safe course is to read the language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense." In the case of the *Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Herbert*, (1913) A.C. 326, at p. 332, Lord Haldane re-affirms the principle, with special reference to legislation of a novel kind. Other cases, of equal authority, could be cited, but it is not necessary.

With respect to the interpretation of a written Constitution, the Privy Council has, in several cases, laid

down principles which should be observed by Courts of law, and these principles have been stated in the clearest terms. In *The Queen v. Burah*, 3 A.C. 889, Lord Selborne, at p. 904, in speaking of the case where a question arises as to whether any given legislation exceeds the power granted, says—"The established Courts of Justice, when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must, of necessity, determine that question; and the only way in which they can properly do so, is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted. If what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited (in which category would, of course, be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it) it is not for any Court of justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions."

In *Ontario v. Canada*, (1912) A.C. 571 at p. 583, Lord Chancellor Loreburn, for the Judicial Committee, said—"In the interpretation of a completely self-governing Constitution founded upon a written organic instrument, such as the British North America Act if the text is explicit the text is conclusive, alike in what it directs and what it forbids. When the text is ambiguous, as, for example, when the words establishing two mutually exclusive jurisdictions are wide enough to bring a particular power within either, recourse must be had to the context and scheme of the Act."

In two decisions, the Judicial Committee has applied these principles to the interpretation of this Constitution, namely, *Webb v. Outrim*, (1907) A.C. p. 51; and the *Colonial Sugar Refining Case*, (1914) A.C. p. 237. In the first mentioned case, quite independently of any observations as to the meaning of the word "unconstitutional," it is clear that their Lordships proceeded on the ordinary lines of statutory construction. In the second case, the Judicial Committee considered the nature of the instrument itself, in order to determine the more satisfactorily the depository of residual powers, and having arrived at the conclusion, as to which this Court has never faltered—that the Commonwealth is a government of enumerated or selected legislative powers, their Lordships examined the language of sec. 51 to ascertain from its words whether the suggested power could be deduced.

The method of arriving at the conclusion is all that is relevant here. We therefore are bound to follow the course of judicial investigation which those two august tribunals of the Empire have marked out as required by law.

Before approaching, for this purpose, the consideration of the provisions of the Constitution itself, we

should state explicitly that the doctrine of "implied prohibition" against the exercise of a power once ascertained in accordance with ordinary rules of construction, was definitely rejected by the Privy Council in *Webb v. Outrim*, (1907) A.C. p. 81. Though subsequently re-affirmed by three members of this Court, it has as often been rejected by two other members of the Court, and has never been unreservedly accepted and applied. From its nature, it is incapable of consistent application, because "necessity" in the sense employed—a political sense—must vary in relation to various powers and various States, and indeed various periods and circumstances. Not only is the judicial branch of the Government inappropriate to determine political necessities, but experience, both in Australia and America, evidenced by discordant decisions, has proved both the elusiveness and the inaccuracy of the doctrine as a legal standard. Its inaccuracy is, perhaps, the more thoroughly perceived when it is considered what the doctrine of "necessity" in a political sense means. It means the necessity of protection against the aggression of some outside and possible hostile body. It is based on distrust, lest powers if once conceded to the least degree might be abused to the point of destruction. But possible abuse of powers is no reason in British law for limiting the natural force of the language creating them. It may be taken into account by the parties when creating the powers, and they by omission of suggested powers, or by safeguards introduced by them into the compact may delimit the powers created. But once the parties have by the terms they employ, defined the permitted limits, no Court has any right to narrow those limits by reason of any fear that the powers, as actually circumscribed by the language naturally understood, may be abused. This has been pointed out by the Privy Council on several occasions, including the case of the *Bank of Toronto v. Lambe*, 12 App. Cas. at pp. 586, 587.

The ordinary meaning of the terms employed in one place may be restricted by terms used elsewhere, that is pure legal construction. But once their true meaning is so ascertained, they cannot be further limited by the fear of abuse. The non-granting of powers, the expressed qualifications of powers granted, the expressed retention of powers, are all to be taken into account by a Court. But the extravagant use of the granted powers in the actual working of the Constitution is a matter to be guarded against by the constituencies and not by the Courts. When the people of Australia, to use the words of the Constitution itself, "united in a Federal Commonwealth," they took power to control by ordinary constitutional means any attempt on the part of the National Parliament to misuse its powers. If it be conceivable that the representatives of the people of Australia as a whole would ever proceed to use their national powers to injure the people of Australia considered

sectionally, it is certainly within the power of the people themselves to resent and reverse what may be done. No protection of this Court in such a case is necessary or proper. Therefore, the doctrine of political necessity, as means of interpretation, is indefensible on any ground.

The one clear line of judicial inquiry as to the meaning of the Constitution must be to read it naturally in the light of the circumstances in which it was made, with knowledge of the combined fabric of the Common Law and the Statute law which preceded it, and then *lucet ipsa per se*.

The Constitution was established by the Imperial Act 63 and 64 Vict. c. 12. The Act recited the agreement of the people of the various colonies as they then were, "to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and under the Constitution hereby established."

"The Crown," as that recital recognises, is one and indivisible throughout the Empire. Elementary as that statement appears, it is essential to recall it because its truth and its force have been overlooked not merely during the argument of this case, but also on previous occasions. Distinctions have been relied on between the "Imperial King," the "Commonwealth King" and "the State King." It has been said that the Commonwealth King has no power to bind the first and the last, and reciprocally, the last cannot bind either of the others. The first step in the examination of the Constitution is to emphasise the primary legal axiom that the Crown is ubiquitous and indivisible in the King's dominions. Though the Crown is one and indivisible throughout the Empire, its legislative, executive and judicial power is exercisable by different agents in different localities, or in respect of different purposes in the same locality, in accordance with the Common Law, or the Statute law there binding the Crown—*Williams v. Howarth*, (1905) A.C. 551; *The Municipalities Case*, 25 A.L.R. at p. 319; *Theodore v. Duncan*, (1919) A.C. at p. 706; and *Zachariassen's Case*, 26 A.L.R. 182.

The Act, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12, establishing the Federal Constitution of Australia, being passed by the Imperial Parliament for the express purpose of regulating the Royal exercise of legislative, executive and judicial power throughout Australia, is by its own inherent force binding on the Crown to the extent of its operation.

It may be that even if sec. 5 of the Act 63 and 64 Vict., c. 12, had not been enacted, the force of sec. 51 of the Constitution itself would have bound the Crown in right of a State so far as any law validly made under it purported to affect the Crown in that right, but however that may be, it is clear to us that in presence of both sec. 5 of the Act, and of sec. 51 of the Constitution, that result must follow. The Commonwealth Constitution as it exists for the time being, dealing expressly with sovereign functions of

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the Crown in its relation to Commonwealth and to States, necessarily so far binds the Crown, and laws validly made by authority of the Constitution, bind, so far as they purport to do so, the people of every State considered as individuals or as political organisms called States; in other words, bind both Crown and subjects.

The grant of legislative power to the Commonwealth is under the doctrine of *Hodge v. Reg.*, 9 A.C. 117, and within the prescribed limits of area and subject-matter, the grant of "an authority as plenary" and as ample as the Imperial Parliament in the "plentitude of its power, possessed and could bestow," a doctrine affirmed and applied in a remarkable degree in *Attorney-General for Canada v. Cain and Gilhula*, (1906) A.C. 542. "The nature and principles of legislation," to employ the words of Lord Selborne in *Burah's Case*, 3 A.C. at page 904, the nature of Dominion self-government, and the decisions just cited entirely preclude, in our opinion, an *à priori* contention that the grant of legislative power to the Commonwealth Parliament as representing the will of the whole of the people of all the States of Australia, should not bind within the geographical area of the Commonwealth and within the limits of the enumerated powers, ascertained by the ordinary process of construction, the States and their agencies, as representing separate sections of the territory. These considerations establish that the extent to which the Crown, considered in relation to the Empire, or to the Commonwealth, or to the States, is bound by any law within the granted authority of the Parliament, depends on the indication which the law gives of intention to bind the Crown. It is undoubted that those who maintain the authority of the Commonwealth Parliament to pass a certain law, should be able to point to some enumerated power containing the requisite authority. But we also hold that where the affirmative terms of a stated power would justify an enactment, it rests upon those who rely on some limitation or restriction upon the power, to indicate it in the Constitution.

Applying these principles to the present case, the matter stands thus. Section 51 (xxxv.) is in terms so general that it extends to all industrial disputes in fact extending beyond the limits of any one State, no exception being expressed as to industrial disputes in which States are concerned; but subject to any special provision to the contrary elsewhere in the Constitution. The respondents suggest only sec. 107 as containing by implication a provision to the contrary. The answer is that sec. 107 contains nothing which in any way either cuts down the meaning of the expression "industrial disputes" in sec. 51 (xxxv.) or exempts the Crown in right of a State when party to an industrial dispute in fact from the operation of Commonwealth legislation under sec. 51 (xxxv.). Section 107 continues the previously existing powers of every State Parliament to legis-

late with respect to (1) State exclusive powers, and (2) State powers which are concurrent with Commonwealth powers. But it is a fundamental and fatal error to read sec. 107 as reserving any power from the Commonwealth that falls fairly within the explicit terms of an express grant in sec. 51; as that grant is reasonably construed, unless that reservation is as explicitly stated. The effect of State legislation, though fully within the powers preserved by sec. 107, may, in a given case, depend on sec. 109. However valid and binding on the people of the State, where no relevant Commonwealth legislation exists, the moment it encounters repugnant Commonwealth legislation operating on the same field, the State legislation must give way. This is the true foundation of the doctrine stated in *D'Emden v. Pedder*, 1 C.L.R. 91, in the so-called rule quoted, which is after all only a paraphrase of sec. 109 of the Constitution. The supremacy thus established by express words of the Constitution has been recognised by the Privy Council without express provision in the case of the Canadian Constitution—see e.g., *La Compagnie Hydraulique de St. Francois v. Continental Heat and Light Co.*, (1909) A.C. 194, at p. 198.

The doctrine of "implied prohibition" finds no place where the ordinary principles of construction are applied so as to discover in the actual terms of the instrument their expressed or necessarily implied meaning. The principle we apply to the Commonwealth we apply also to the States, leaving their respective acts of legislation full operation within their respective areas and subject-matters; but in case of conflict, giving to valid Commonwealth legislation the supremacy expressly declared by the Constitution, measuring that supremacy according to the very words of sec. 109. That section which says—"When 'a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth the latter shall prevail and the former shall to the extent of the inconsistency,'" gives supremacy, not to any particular class of Commonwealth Acts, but to every Commonwealth Act, over, not merely State Acts passed under concurrent powers, but all State Acts, though passed under an exclusive power, if any provisions of the two conflict, as they may. If they do not, then *cadit quæstio*.

We therefore hold that States, and persons natural or artificial, representing States, when parties to industrial disputes in fact, are subject to Commonwealth legislation under pl. (xxxv.) of sec. 51 of the Constitution, if such legislation on its true construction applies to them.

That answers the first of the questions for our determination, which we have categorically set out.

2. *The Minister for Trading Concerns*.—The second question arises as to each respondent. Of the three State respondents mentioned, the only real one is the Minister for Trading Concerns; the other two may turn out to be mere names. The dispute to which the Minister is party being manifestly and admittedly

one which no one would deny was an "industrial dispute" if a private person were the employer, it follows from what has been said that it is, as regards the Minister, an industrial dispute within the meaning of sec. 51 (xxxv.).

3. *Previous Cases.*—It is proper that, in view of our revision of prior decisions, we should, for the guidance of Commonwealth and States, and the better to evidence the meaning of this judgment, indicate the future authority or otherwise of some of the principal cases involved in our consideration of this matter.

D'Emden v. Pedder, 1 C.L.R. 91, was a case of conflict between Commonwealth law and State law. The Commonwealth law—"Audit Act 1901"—made provision as to how public moneys of the Commonwealth were to be paid out; written vouchers were required for all accounts paid—secs. 34 (6) and 46. The irresistible construction of the Act is that these vouchers, which the law requires for the protection of the Commonwealth Consolidated Revenue Fund, are to be under the sole control of the Commonwealth authorities. A State Act, making it an offence to give such a voucher except on a condition imposed by the State Parliament, namely, a tax in aid of the State revenue, was so far manifestly inconsistent with the Commonwealth law. Section 109 of the Constitution applies to such a case, and establishes the invalidity to that extent of the State law. The decision rests on the supremacy created by sec. 109, and is sound. So far as any observation in that case can be regarded as favouring a reciprocal doctrine, creating invalidity of Commonwealth legislation by reason of State Constitution or legislation, that observation must be considered as unwarranted by the Constitution and overruled.

Deakin v. Webb and *Deakin v. Lyne*, 1 C.L.R. 585, 10 A.L.R. 237, were cases in which it was held that the State "Income Tax Act" of Victoria did not validly extend to tax moneys which had been received as Commonwealth salary. The decision was rested on two grounds, both found in the American case of *Dobbins v. Erie County*, 16 Peters 435. The first ground is that taxation of a person who is a Federal officer necessarily *per se* so far as it reaches money he received as salary, and although it so reaches that money by reason of provisions which apply generally to the whole community without discrimination, is an interference with the means employed by the Commonwealth for the performance of its constitutional functions. The second ground was that it was in conflict with the Commonwealth law fixing the officer's salary. The law, as laid down in those cases, was dissented from by the Privy Council in *Webb v. Outrim*, (1907) A.C. 81, and was disapproved by two Justices as against three in the subsequent case of *Baxter v. Commissioners of Taxation*, 13 A.L.R. 313. Having regard to the principles we have stated, the first ground is erroneous. An act of the State Legislature

discriminating against Commonwealth officers might well be held to have the necessary effect of conflicting with the provision made by the Commonwealth law for its officers relatively to the rest of the community. The second ground depends on the construction of the Commonwealth Act with which the State Act is alleged to conflict. If, on a proper construction of both Acts, they conflict, the State Act is, to that extent, invalid. But that is so by force of the express words of sec. 109, and not by reason of any implied prohibition. The final result is to be reached, not by a Commonwealth Act permitting the State Legislature to exercise a power it does not possess—except where the Constitution itself so provides, as in secs. 91 and 114—but by valid Commonwealth legislation expressly or implied marking limits, conflicting with State legislation which is valid except for the operation of sec. 109. It is on this ground that the actual decision in *Chaplin v. Commissioner of Taxes*, 17 A.L.R. 422, is to be upheld as correct. *Baxter's Case*, of course, is in the same position as *Deakin v. Webb*. In the *Railway Servants Case*, 13 A.L.R. 273, the decision in *D'Emden v. Pedder*, 1 C.L.R., page 91, was applied *e converso*. To reach that result the Court, relying upon a great number of American cases, held (1) that the rule as quoted from the earlier case could and should be applied conversely; and (2) that State railways were specially recognised by the Constitution as "State instrumentalities" for "governmental functions," and beyond the ambit of Commonwealth legislative power.

It is apparent that if, as we have stated, the true basis of *D'Emden v. Pedder*, 1 C.L.R. 91, is the supremacy of Commonwealth law over State law, where they meet on any field, there can be no possible reciprocity. Mutual supremacy is a contradiction of terms. Commonwealth legislation on an exclusive field, such as the post office, might conflict in incidental provisions with State legislation on a main exclusive field or as to incidental provisions; for instance, offences might be inconsistently dealt with, or, as recent examples, the prohibition of State referenda, and the closing of hotels on Commonwealth Election Day. The first ground is not legally sustainable. With respect to the second ground, the general proprietary right of the States in respect of their railways is undoubtedly recognised and specially protected; but the Constitution just as clearly confers upon the Commonwealth Parliament the express power stated in pl. (xxxv.), and does not proceed to except therefrom the States, as it does (subject to a qualification) in relation to banking (pl. xiii.) and insurance (pl. xiv.). But, as Lord Dunedin said for the Privy Council in *Canada v. Ritchie*, (1919) A.C. at p. 1005—"It has often been pointed out that the 'domain of legislation is quite a different matter 'from proprietary rights.' It was so pointed out, for instance, in the *Fisheries Case*, (1898) A.C. 700;

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and in *Seybold's Case*, (1903) A.C. at p. 82. Railways not only can be, but have been, and are at the present time, privately owned and operated. They do not stand in any different position so far as regards the legislative authority of the Commonwealth under pl. (xxxv.) from that occupied by the trading concerns of Western Australia. "The text is explicit," to repeat Lord Loreburn's phrase. So the matter stands with respect to the *Railway Servants' Case* in principle. But further, it is hopelessly opposed to the decision in the *Steel Rails Case*, 14 A.L.R. 516.

In that case it was unanimously decided by five Justices that, apart from sec. 114 of the Constitution, there was nothing to prevent the Commonwealth "Customs Act" operating so as to prevent the States importing steel rails for their railways free of duty. If the "Customs Act" applied at all, it could apply to prohibit the importation of steel rails or any other article required for State railways.

A more drastic interference than that case sanctions can hardly be imagined. It was an insistence on money being applied from the State Treasury for purposes of the Commonwealth Treasury, as a condition of the State being allowed to import steel rails from abroad for use on its railways. Some difference of opinion occurred as to the nature of the duty, but none as to the primary validity of the interference. Difference of opinion also arose as to the reasons for permitting the primary interference. Griffith, C.J., relied on (1) the doctrine of "necessity," and (2) that the State function protected must be exercised within the State. The first ground we have dealt with, and as to the second it is to be observed that the function sought to be protected was not the function of importing goods, but of operating State railways. Barton, J., thought that as the legislative power of the Commonwealth was exclusive, the State could not complain. But no distinction is made in the Constitution as to Commonwealth authority between its exclusive and its concurrent powers. That distinction affects the legislative power of the States, but not the effect of Commonwealth Acts once made. O'Connor, J., rested on the necessity of maintaining the effective exercise of the Commonwealth power. But that applies to every power. Isaacs, J., rested on his views in the *Wire Netting Case*, 14 A.L.R. 505. In that case Isaacs, J., and Higgins, J., held primarily that the Commonwealth commerce power as to foreign trade was complete, that the Crown was indivisible, but that its power varies in different localities, even in the same locality, and therefore the Crown in right of New South Wales, was bound by what the Crown, in right of the Commonwealth, had enacted.

It is plain, therefore, that the utmost confusion and uncertainty exist as the decisions now stand. The *Railway Servants' Case* is wholly irreconcilable with the *Steel Rails Case*. The latter is sustainable on the principles we have enunciated, the former is not.

The Railway Servants' Case, 13 A.L.R. 273, consequently cannot any longer be regarded as law. There are other cases in which the doctrine of implied prohibition is more or less called in aid to limit the otherwise plain import of legislative grants to the Commonwealth. It is sometimes difficult to say how far the decision is dependent upon such a doctrine, and therefore we hesitate to pronounce upon those cases, and leave them for further consideration, subject to the law as settled by this decision. But it is beyond any doubt that the doctrine of "implied prohibition" can no longer be permitted to sustain a contention, and so far as any recorded decision rests upon it, that decision must be regarded as unsound.

We have anxiously endeavoured to remove the inconsistencies fast accumulating and obscuring the comparatively clear terms of the national compact of the Australian people; we have striven to fulfil the duty the Constitution places upon this Court of loyally permitting that great instrument of government to speak with its own voice, clear of any qualifications which the people of the Commonwealth, or at their request, the Imperial Parliament, have not thought fit to express, and clear of any questions of expediency or political exigency which this Court is neither intended to consider nor equipped with the means of determining.

We therefore answer the two questions in the terms to be stated by the Chief Justice.

HIGGINS, J., read the following judgment:—The Minister for Trading Concerns of Western Australia, and the State Implement and Engineering Works and the State Sawmills, both under his control, are three out of 844 respondents to a plaint. They carry on operations in which members of the claimant organisation are employed; and for profit, in competition with outside employers. The question is, substantially, are they amenable to the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, and should they be included in the finding of the High Court under sec. 21AA as being parties to the dispute. They in fact dispute—oppose—the claims in the plaint.

There stands at present a decision of the Full High Court, the unanimous decision of the three original Justices of the Court, to the effect that the railway servants of a State (New South Wales) are outside the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Court—*Federated, &c., Railway and Tramway Service Association v. New South Wales Railway Traffic Employees' Association*, 13 A.L.R. 273. But the decision is now directly impugned by the claimant, and it is our duty to reconsider the subject, and to obey the Constitution and the Act rather than any decision of this Court, if the decision be shown to have been mistaken.

So far as the Act is concerned, there can be no doubt that the Federal Parliament intended State

undertakings to be subject to the Court's powers of conciliation and arbitration. For, under sec. 4 of the Act the words "industrial dispute" include "any dispute in relation to employment in an industry carried on by or under the control of the Commonwealth or a State or any public authority constituted under the Commonwealth or a State." The position which this Court took in the *Railway Servants' Case* was that the Parliament had by these words exceeded its powers under the Constitution.

Looking now at the Constitution, and interpreting it simply as if we were not under the constraint of any authority, the words used in sec. 51 are general and unrestricted as to pl. (xxxv.), and there is not the slightest indication that the power conferred on the Federal Parliament as to legislation on the subject of the placitum was to stop short at State industries or activities. The Parliament is there given power "subject to this Constitution to make laws for the peace order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to . . . (xxxv.) conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State." Putting on one side any difficulty as to the precise force of the expression "industrial disputes" (for we have here definite industries carried on for profit and in competition), it is clear that the expression means the same thing whoever is the employer—person or firm or company or State. Fitters pass from an engineering firm to the Government railway shops; they do the same kind of work in both places; they claim the same rates in both places; the dispute is the same in both places; the union acts as to both places. It is quite as much to the interests of the community to preserve the continuity of operations in the railway shops as in the works of the firm. The fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, is that a Statute is to be expounded according to the intent of the Parliament that made it, and that intention has to be found by an examination of the language used in the Statute as a whole. The question is, what does the language mean, and when we find what the language means, in its ordinary and natural sense, it is our duty to obey that meaning, even if we think the result to be inconvenient or impolitic or improbable. Words limiting the power are not to be read into the Statute if it can be construed without a limitation—*per* Bowen, L.J., *R. v. Liverpool Justices*, 11 Q.B.D. 638, 649; and see *King v. Burrell*, 12 Ad. & El. 460, 468. The Parliament is given a power here to make any law which, as it thinks, may conduce to the peace, order and good government of Australia on the subject of pl. (xxxv.), "subject to this Constitution." There is no limitation to the power in the words of the placitum, and unless the limitation can be found elsewhere in the Constitution, it does not exist at all.

But there is even more reason in this case than usual for not treating this power as limited. For it is embedded in a series of other powers, as to some of which there is an express limitation with regard to State functions. In pl. (xiii.) the subject is "Banking other than State banking." In pl. (xiv.) the subject is "Insurance other than State insurance." Yet even in these cases any Commonwealth legislation may, by the following words of the placita, apply to State banking and State insurance if "extending beyond the limits of the State concerned." These latter words correspond with the words in pl. (xxxv.), and show the intention of the Constitution to be that the Federal Parliament may regulate banking or insurance or industrial disputes which extend beyond one State, even if the State is banker, or insurer or employer. Moreover, pl. (ii.) gives a power of "taxation" to the Commonwealth; but there is an express exception in sec. 114 of "taxation" on property of any kind belonging to a State. These exceptions would not be necessary if the power to legislate on the subjects stated did not include, but for the exception, a power to make legislation binding on the States. The express exception in one case prevents the implication of the exception in the other case—*expressio unius exclusio alterius*. The British Parliament, in conferring the Constitution, has said that the Parliament of the Commonwealth may not apply its legislation to State banking or State insurance or (in taxation) to State property; but it has not said that the Parliament may not apply its legislation to industrial disputes between the State and its employees, provided that the dispute extends beyond the limits of any one State. It is only where the meaning is not clear that we are entitled to weigh probabilities or expediency. But even if the meaning were not clear, probabilities and expediency are in favour of the view that the Constitution, in its legislation with the object of securing continuity of operations in industries, would not forbid the extension of the same benefit to the States. Indeed, in a country such as Australia, where the State activities are more numerous than in most countries, and where such a large proportion of the population is in State Government employment, it is extremely unlikely that such a power as that contained in pl. (xxxv.) would be withheld in its operation from employment in the service of the State. Moreover, unless those employed in the State service are to be subject to regulation under pl. (xxxv.), as well as outside employees, the object of the placitum must often be defeated. I mentioned in *The Australian Workers Union v. Adelaide Milling Co. (The Wheat Lumpers' Case)*, 25 A.L.R. 243, the difficulty which arose as to the Victorian coal mines. The State had the principal coal mine undertaking, and the private employers, in competition with the State, could not give to their employees terms which they would have otherwise been willing to give, unless the State were

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bound to give similar terms. In the *Wheat Lumpers' Case* itself, some men, employed by the State, were carrying or moving bags of wheat to a stack; and other men employed by shipowners and others, were carrying or moving the same bags to the ships. Under the doctrine hitherto adopted, the Court of Conciliation was able to conciliate or arbitrate as to one set of men, and unable to do so as to the other set. Contrasts as to the conditions of the respective sets of men were sure to arise, and did arise; but the Court could not prevent the unrest which the contrasts caused. If, as in Western Australia, the State carry on the butchering business, how can a dispute be effectively settled if the State enterprise be not bound? Counsel for the respondents here, and for the States intervening, say, however, that as to some of the subjects mentioned in sec. 51, other than banking and insurance, there is an exception implied that State activities are not to be touched; but they have failed to show any *discrimen* whereby this Court can distinguish the subjects as to which Parliament can apply its legislation to the States, and the subjects as to which it cannot. Certainly, if there were to be a *discrimen* between the subjects, as to the power to apply Commonwealth laws to State activities, it would be most extraordinary to find industrial disputes in the class of subjects as to which the States are not to have the benefit of the machinery devised by Parliament in aid of continuity in industrial operations.

On ordinary principles of interpretation, therefore, it would seem clear that it is for Parliament to say whether it would include the State industries or activities in its legislation under pl. (xxxv.) or not. Parliament consists of the King, Senate and House of Representatives—sec. 1 of Constitution; and if the King object to be bound by a Bill he can refuse his assent thereto, or disallow the Act—sec. 59, and there is express provision for reserving a Bill for his assent—sec. 60. I have already stated that the Federal Parliament has actually expressed its will that State industries should be subject to the powers of the Court of Conciliation.

But it has been urged that because the Constitution does not itself say that the Acts passed under sec. 51 (xxxv.) shall bind the Crown, there is no power for Parliament to bind the Crown. The same reasoning would apply, of course, to Acts passed under sec. 51 as to immigration and emigration—(xxvii.); to bills of exchange and promissory notes—(xvi.); to currency coinage and legal tender—(xii.); to patents and copyrights—(xviii.); to aliens—(xix.); to bankruptcy and insolvency—(xvii.), &c. Suppose that under the Common Law—or under express State legislation—the Crown has priority over all other creditors, it is argued that a Federal law as to bankruptcy, enacting that Crown debts are to be paid *pari passu* with other debts, would not bind the State! The true position I take to be that the rule as to the Crown's rights not being affected by an

Act unless by express words or by necessary implication applies, not to a Constitution, but to the Acts made by the Parliament under the powers of the Constitution. The opening words of sec. 51 give to the Parliament power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth on the subjects mentioned in that section; the power is to be construed as co-extensive with the terms used, to their full purport—Story on *Constitution*, secs. 424, 426; and if Parliament think that to apply its laws to the States would conduce to that objects, the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth, it can say so. Parliament has actually said so, as to the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation by sec. 4 of that Act. If the Parliament cannot bind the Crown by its Act—the "State Crown," so called—unless the Constitution says that it may bind it, then it would follow that no Act of the Victorian Parliament (for example) can bind the Crown, and the numerous Acts passed by the State Parliament which purport to bind the Crown are invalid. For the words of the Imperial Act conferring on the Victorian Parliament the power to legislate do not mention the Crown—"There shall be established in Victoria . . . one Legislative Council and one "Legislative Assembly . . . and Her Majesty "shall have power by and with the advice and consent of the said Council and Assembly to make "laws in and for Victoria in all cases whatsoever"—sec. 1. According to O'Connor, J., in *R. v. Sutton*, 14 A.L.R. at pp. 511, 512, the doctrine that the King is not to be treated as bound unless named does not apply to a Constitution at all. The rule rests on the presumption that the King, the legislator, is making laws for his subjects and not for himself. It applies to a State Act as between the State Government and the people subject to the State laws; as to a Federal Act as between the Federal Government and the people subject to the Federal laws; it does not apply to a British law (the Constitution) as between the British Crown and the Crown in right of the State. By the Federal Constitution, the King in Parliament (the British Parliament) is, as it were, creating a new agent; and the principle of the rule is inapplicable in such a case, or in determining the powers of one agent in relation to another agent. In *Sutton's Case* wire-netting belonging to a State was removed from control of the Customs by executive order of a State Minister, and this Court held the removal to be illegal, although the Crown was not named in the "Customs Act." So, too, in the very next case reported—*Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Collector of Customs*, 14 A.L.R. 516, it was held that the State was bound to pay Customs duty on steel rails which it owned and was importing for the purposes of the State railways.

Moreover, it is evident, as I have stated, from the form of the placita in sec. 51 of the Federal Constitution, that the Federal Parliament was to have

power to bind the State Crown except so far as the power to bind it is expressly negated, as in pl. (XIII.) and pl. (XIV.). The power to legislate is plenary, for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth, within the limits of the subjects mentioned in sec. 51. The Federal Parliament, "when acting within those limits is not in any sense "an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament, "but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers "of legislation as large and of the same nature as "those of Parliament (*i.e.*, the Imperial Parliament) "itself." This was said by Lord Selborne and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as to an Act of the Council of the Governor-General of India; and—to say the least—no ground has been suggested for denying power of the same nature to the Parliament of Australia. The same principle was applied by the Judicial Committee to legislation of the Province of Ontario under the "British North America Act 1867"—*Hodge v. Reg.*, 9 A.C. 117, 132; and see *Powell v. Apollo Candle Co.*, 10 A.C. 282; and in other cases. It has not yet been suggested that the Imperial Parliament cannot bind the Crown, and it follows from these cases that if the Imperial Parliament can bind the Crown, the Federal Parliament can bind it within the limits of its allotted subjects.

In connection with this subject, much argument has been addressed to sec. 5 of the "Constitution Act"—what we call the "covering sections" of the Constitution. It provides that that Act and all laws made under the Constitution "shall be binding on the "Courts judges and people of every State . . . "notwithstanding anything in the laws of any State." I take sec. 51 of the Constitution as defining subject-matters for legislation, and covering sec. 5 as defining the persons who are to obey the legislation. Once that we find a valid Federal law—say a law as to trade and commerce with other countries—the Courts and Judges and people of every State must obey it, whatever the State laws may say to the contrary. Organised bodies of persons, such as incorporated companies or municipal corporations or States, are not mentioned, for they always act through "people"—human beings, and these human beings have to obey the valid Federal Act, whatever the State law says. The State law is to have no efficacy for them as against the valid Federal law; they must obey the Federal law as if the State law did not exist, and whether they act for State or for corporation or company. Here, the Minister for Trading Concerns is, by the "Trading Concerns Act" (W.A.) constituted a corporation. The successive Ministers have the rights and duties conferred by the Act, and must obey the Act except so far as it is inconsistent with a valid Federal Act; but to the extent of the inconsistency the Minister has to obey the Federal Act, not the State Act—sec. 109 of Constitution.

The position seems so clear that my only difficulty lies in certain decisions of this Court, particularly the decision in the *Railway Servants' Case*, 13 A.L.R. 273. It was there held by the original Justices of this Court, in 1906, that the Federal Parliament could not, through the Court of Conciliation which it created, "interfere with" the railways of New South Wales. I pass by the dyslogistic connotation of the words "interfere with," in reference to a Federal power and a Federal Act which were designed to aid employers and employees alike, and to secure the continuity of operations, for I have sufficiently referred to this matter in other cases. In a previous case—*D'Emden v. Pedder*, 1 C.L.R. 91, this Court held that a Federal officer was not liable to a penalty under a "Stamps Act" of Tasmania for giving to the paying officer an unstamped receipt for salary, the receipt being given in pursuance of a duty imposed by the Commonwealth "Audit Act 1901." But that was a case in which it was said that the State law was interfering with the Commonwealth activities, over which the Commonwealth Parliament had exclusive power—see p. 111. For the Commonwealth officer was employed in the Post Office department, the control of that department had been transferred to the executive government of the Commonwealth, and under sec. 52 the Federal Parliament had the exclusive power to make laws with respect to matters relating to the department. The supremacy of the Federal legislation—see sec. 109—would be a sufficient ground for the decision, although that was not only the ground stated, and the principle as enunciated by Griffith, C.J., was—"When a State "attempts to give to its legislative or executive "authority an operation which, if valid, would fetter, "control or interfere with the free exercise of the "legislative or executive power of the Commonwealth, "the attempt, unless expressly authorised by the Constitution, is to that extent invalid and inoperative"—p. 111.

But in the *Railway Servants' Case*, 13 A.L.R. 273, the Full High Court went further. It said that the doctrine laid down in *D'Emden v. Pedder*, 1 C.L.R. 91, was equally applicable to interference on the part of the Commonwealth authority with a State authority. For this ruling the Court relied on a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in *Collector v. Day*, 11 Wall. 113. There it was said—"It is admitted that there is no express provision in the "Constitution that prohibits the general government "from taxing the means and instrumentalities of the "States, nor is there any prohibiting the States from "taxing the means and instrumentalities of that "Government. In both cases the exception rests upon "necessary implication, and is upheld by the great "law of self-preservation, as any Government whose "means (are) employed in conducting its operations, "if subject to the control of another and distinct "Government, can exist only at the mercy of that

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"Government." Whatever opinion we may hold as to the sufficiency of this reasoning, as applied to the United States Constitution, is really immaterial, for we have to construe the Australian Constitution, and, as the Australian Constitution actually excludes such implication—sec. 109—by giving supremacy to a valid Federal law over State laws otherwise valid, I am free to say, and bound in duty to say, that in my opinion it is wrong to apply the principle of *Collector v. Day*, 11 Wall. 113, to the construction of sec. 51 (xxxv.).

This, my conclusion, is of course quite consistent with the famous case of *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 4 Wheat. 316, where it was held that a State tax on a Federal Bank was unconstitutional and invalid. There is no need for me to comment on that case here—see *Barter v. Commissioners of Taxation*, 13 A.L.R. 313.

Counsel for the respondents have properly pointed out to us the grave responsibility of overruling a decision of the Full High Court which has stood for thirteen years. No argument has been hitherto entertained by this Court against the *Railway Servants' case*. There was an attempt to impugn it in the *Case of the Municipalities* last year, but the majority of the Court intimated that in the existing state of their minds it would be useless to attack the case, and Counsel therefore refrained from argument—25 A.L.R. 309. In the case of the *Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Collector*, 14 A.L.R. 516 at p. 528, I find that I expressed doubts "as to the doctrines adopted and the expressions used in *D'Emden v. Pedder*, 1 C.L.R. 91, and the subsequent cases," and as to the doctrine "that the railways are a State governmental function in the same sense as the Legislature, the Executive and the judiciary are governmental functions." I said also (p. 528)—"I regard the doctrine as to the King not being bound save by express words as being inapplicable as between the States and the Commonwealth, at all events in the exercise of an exclusive power of the Commonwealth, and I regard State laws and State powers in respect of the railways as subordinated to the Commonwealth powers with regard to trade and commerce, and with regard to Customs taxation." In the recent *Wheat Lumpers' Case*, 25 A.L.R. 243, I treated the *Railway Servants' Case* as not binding on me for the purpose of my judgment, because that case had been based on a ground which was not applicable to the wheat-lumping operations—the ground that "at the time of the Constitution the construction and maintenance of railways were to be regarded as governmental functions"—see, also, *Federated Engine-Drivers' Case*, 17 A.L.R. at p. 308. It cannot be said, therefore, that the doctrines of *D'Emden v. Pedder* and the *Railway Servants' Case* have been accepted without protest. But still, respect for our late colleagues necessarily makes us hesitate, and I fully

accept the view that it is fitting *stare decisis* unless the decision, to our minds, is manifestly wrong.

The crux of the *Railway Servants' Case*, 13 A.L.R. 273, is to be found, I think, at p. 281. It had been held in *South Carolina v. United States*, 199 U.S. 437, that the State, having made the liquor trade an absolute monopoly, could not rely on the doctrine of *Collector v. Day*, 11 Wall. 113, as a defence against an action for excise duty on its liquor. The reason given was that the doctrine must be confined to "strictly governmental functions" of the State. The High Court said (a) that "the execution or administration of the laws of the State is in the strictest sense a governmental function;" (b) that "the construction and maintenance of roads and means of communication is one of the most important functions of government; and (c) that in the year 1900 the construction and maintenance of railways" was in fact regarded as a governmental function in all the Australian Colonies, and "that they are expressly recognised as such" in the Constitution. But although where a State undertakes to lay and work railways, the construction and maintenance of railways become, of course, a governmental function in one sense, that functions is not "strictly governmental" in the sense of being a function essential to all government, a function like the legislative, executive and judicial functions, without which a civilised State cannot be conceived, a function with which the State cannot part. Since the *South Carolina Case*, 199 U.S. 437, the limit of the exemption has been even more clearly defined in *Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.*, 220 U.S. 157-8; and see *Vilas v. Manila*, 220 U.S. 345—cases which had not occurred, and, necessarily, were not before our learned colleagues in the *Railway Servants' Case*, 13 A.L.R. 273. In *Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.*, 220 U.S. 157-8—a case of an excise tax on corporations and joint stock companies with respect to the carrying on business—the *South Carolina Case*, 199 U.S. 437, was followed and was treated as deciding that "the exemption of State agencies and instrumentalities from national taxation was limited to those of a strictly governmental character, and did not extend to those used by the State in carrying on business of a private character . . . The cases unite in exempting from Federal taxation the means and instrumentalities employed in carrying on the governmental operations of the State. The exercise of such right as the establishment of a judiciary, the employment of officers to administer and execute the laws, and similar governmental functions, cannot be taxed by the Federal Government."

The position, therefore, is that even in the country of its origin, the United States, the doctrine of the exemption of State activities from Commonwealth legislation is held not to apply to commercial undertakings of the State or created by the State, but to apply to strictly governmental functions only, of the

kind which had been stated. Nor can the reasons (b) and (c) of the High Court be applied to the engineering or the sawmilling business or to the business of running railways. But, personally, I desire not to be understood as regarding the case of *Collector v. Day*, 11 Wall. 113, as applying to our Constitution, even with the limitations which have been given to it by the subsequent cases. My view is that, on the true construction of sec. 51, the State activities which are not distinctly excluded from the Federal powers by the Constitution are subject to the Federal laws to the full extent of their meaning, and that there is no exemption from Federal Acts unless and until they pass beyond the limits of the Federal powers on their true construction.

I am of opinion that the *Railway Servants' Case*, 13 A.L.R. 273, should be overruled, and that the question should be answered as proposed by the Chief Justice.

GAVAN DUFFY, J., read the following judgment:—As I have the misfortune to differ from my brother Judges in this case my opinion can have no effect on the ultimate decision of the Court, but I think it respectful to them that I should briefly state the reasons for my dissent.

The Government of Western Australia, through its agents, is carrying on certain industrial enterprises in which it employs members of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. The Society, by plaint No. 52 of 1919, sought the intervention of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in respect of an industrial dispute alleged to exist between it and a number of respondents, including the said agents. The Society assumed that the Government of Western Australia would not be willing to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court, and for the purpose of determining whether the State of Western Australia, in these circumstances, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court, made application to my brother Higgins, as a Justice of the High Court sitting in Chambers, for a decision on the question whether a dispute or any part thereof existed, or was threatened, impending or probable, as an industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State, between the Society and each of the respondents. When the application came on for hearing, my brother Higgins, acting under the provisions of sec. 18 of the "Judiciary Act," stated a case for the opinion of the Full Court in which he asked the following questions:—(1) Is the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration competent to entertain for the purpose of "conciliation and (if necessary) arbitration the claims in the plaint or any and which of them as between the claimant and the respondents mentioned in par. 4 or any or which of them? (2) What is the proper decision for me as a Justice of the High Court to give under sec. 21AAA as to the said respondents?"

By sec. 4 of the "Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act" an industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State includes a dispute in relation to employment in an industry carried on by or under the control of the Commonwealth or a State or any public authority constituted by the Commonwealth or a State, and as the only reason suggested in this case for holding that an industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State does not exist between the Society and the agents of the Government of Western Australia is that the industry was carried on by or under the control of the State, the answer to Question 2 must, of course, be that the alleged dispute did exist. My brother Higgins should have so answered it, and we should so answer it now, and refuse to answer Question 1, which, in the circumstances, could not arise in determining the subject-matter of the application. An application under sec. 21AAA might, perhaps, have been made to determine Question 1 as a question of law arising in relation "to the dispute or to the proceeding," but no such application was in fact made to my brother Higgins. The substantial question which the parties were anxious to argue, and in fact did argue, before us was whether the Federal Parliament had jurisdiction under sec. 51 (xxxv.) to legislate with respect to disputes between a State carrying on industrial operations and its employees. The other members of the Court are unanimously of opinion that we ought to take the opportunity of deciding that question without too nicely considering the means by which it has been brought before us, and in deference to their opinion, I shall proceed to consider it. We have been asked to approach the question as if it were free of authority, and if necessary to overrule any cases already decided by this Court. I shall therefore not rely on such cases as authorities, and since my opinion on the constitutional question does not commend itself to the majority of the Court, it is unnecessary for me to indicate how far it is inconsistent with any decided case. The relevant portions of sec. 51 are as follows:—"51. The Parliament shall subject to this Constitution have power to make laws for the peace order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to . . . (xxxv.) Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State."

For the Society it is said that the opening words of the section are so large that they enable Parliament to impose upon all persons, whether natural or artificial, and whether sovereign or subject, obedience to any laws with respect to a subject-matter committed to Parliament by any of the succeeding subsections, or placita, as they have sometimes been called, so far as such laws are for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth, and that sub-sec. (xxxv.) includes every industrial dis-

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pute extending beyond the limits of any one State, and applies no less because one of the parties to the dispute happens to be a State, or speaking more technically, the Crown operating in a State. Let us assume that the Crown operating in Western Australia is a party to a "dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State" within the meaning of the sub-section; it then becomes necessary to discuss the opening words of the section. It will be observed that the power conferred is a power to legislate "subject to this Constitution," and if the section has reference not only to the subject-matter of legislation, by to the persons who may be bound by it, it follows that no persons can be bound if to bind them would be inconsistent with any part of the Constitution. The existence of the State as a polity is as essential to the Constitution as the existence of the Commonwealth. The fundamental conception of the Federation as set out in the Constitution is that the people of Australia who had theretofore existed in several distinct communities under distinct polities should thenceforward unite for certain specific purposes in one Federal Commonwealth, but for all other purposes should remain precisely as they had been before Federation. In pursuance of that conception, secs. 106 and 107 preserve the constitution of each State as it existed at the establishment of the Commonwealth, and every power of a State Parliament unless it is by the Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State. In this case it is not disputed that the industrial operations conducted by the Crown in Western Australia are within the Constitution of that State. They are authorised under its legislative power, and conducted under its executive power. It follows from what I have said that the Crown in conducting such operations cannot be bound by legislation under sec. 51 (xxxv.) unless some authority to bind it can be found outside the section. The words "for the peace order and good government" have constantly been adopted in the constitutions of self-governing British colonies where the power to legislate is general, and where they are used to describe the content of that power. It is not easy to give them such a meaning in sec. 51, which deals with enumerated powers; it is enough to say that they seem to delimit the subject-matter of legislation, not to enumerate the persons whom the legislation shall bind. It has been argued for the respondents that this is the function of sec. 5 of the "Constitution Act," which provides that the Act (and consequently the Constitution, which is part of the Act) and all laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth under the Constitution shall be binding on the Courts, Judges and people of every State and of every part of the Commonwealth, notwithstanding anything in the laws of any State. If this section is to be taken as enumerating those whom the Federal Parliament has power to bind, it is im-

portant to notice that it does not in terms include the Crown, though the Crown was a party to the agreement recited in the preamble of the "Constitution Act," and when that Act was submitted in bill form for the consideration of the law officers of the Crown in London, it provided that the Act should bind the Crown, and we know as an historical fact that the provision was deleted at their instance. But in my opinion the section cannot be taken as a complete enumeration of those whom the Federal Parliament has power to bind. It cannot be pretended that the Parliament has not power to control the Crown exercising the ordinary executive power of the Commonwealth, nor that an alien, coming temporarily within the Commonwealth, would remain wholly unaffected by the Constitution or by any of the laws made under it, though the section is silent on these matters. It is beyond doubt that the Imperial Parliament had power to authorise Federal legislation with respect to any operation of the Crown within a State, and where it has done so in express words, no difficulty arises, but where there are no such words, what is the test of Federal jurisdiction? In no case, so far as I am aware, does the constitution of a British colony enumerate those who shall be subject to its legislative power, but it is a commonplace in constitutional law that underlying the grant of legislative power in the Commonwealth of Australia as in every other self-governing British colony, is the hypothesis that such power binds only the Crown operating within that colony, British subjects who are citizens of the colony, and, to a modified extent, others with respect to their rights within the colony. In *Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales*, (1891) A.C., p. 455, a case which is commonly cited by writers on constitutional law as establishing the proposition that a colonial Legislature has no power to make laws having extra territorial validity and operation, the Privy Council expressly recognised the limitation which I have just stated. In delivering the judgment of the Court, Lord Halsbury, L.C., said—"Their jurisdiction is confined within their own territories and the maxim which has been more than once quoted, '*Extra territorium 'jus dicenti impune non paretur,'*' would be applicable to such a case. Lord Wensleydale, when Baron Parke, advising the House of Lords in *Jefferys v. Boosey*, 4 H.L.R. 815, expresses the same proposition in very terse language. He says—4 H.L.R. 926—"The Legislature has no power over any persons except its own subjects—that is, persons natural born subjects, or resident, or whilst they are within the limits of the kingdom. The Legislature can impose no duties except on them, and when legislating for the benefit of persons, must, *primâ facie*, be considered to mean the benefit of those who owe obedience to our laws, and whose interests the Legislature is under a correlative obligation to protect."

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in a British colony the King legislates with the advice of the representatives of the people. His laws bind his subjects within the colony because they are his subjects, they bind himself as King under the Constitution of the colony so far as he chooses to make himself subject to them, and they bind strangers with respect to their rights within the colony because such persons must to that extent be deemed to have submitted themselves to his jurisdiction. It is recognised that it would be intolerable that a stranger should be at liberty to claim the hospitality and protection of a community without subjecting himself to such general regulations as may be necessary for the peace, order and good government of the community. For the purposes of the present case, it is unnecessary to consider what portion of the municipal law is binding on an alien, or how far the Crown, operating under the Constitution of one State, is amenable to the laws of another State. I shall assume that the operations now conducted by the Crown in Western Australia would be subject to the laws of South Australia with respect to industrial undertakings if such operations extended into that State, because in such circumstances the Crown could not take with it its character of maker and administrator of the law, and must be deemed to have submitted itself to the laws of South Australia, as if it were a private person. Why should not these operations be subject to the laws of the Commonwealth within the Commonwealth territory? As we have seen, the legislative power of the Commonwealth under sec. 51, being subject to the Constitution, cannot affect the State in the performance of functions allotted to it by the Constitution. But apart from this limitation it is quite clear that though the territory of the State is the territory of the Commonwealth for the purpose of executing the functions committed to it by the Constitution, for every other purpose it is the territory of the State and of the State alone. In performing the functions allotted to it by the Constitution, the Crown operating in the State cannot in any way be said to abandon its legislative and administrative powers or to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Parliament.

It follows from what I have said that in my opinion the Federal Parliament has not jurisdiction under sec. 51 (xxxv.) to legislate with respect to disputes between a State carrying on industrial operations and its employees.

Questions as amended answered:

1. Yes. 2. Yes.

[Solicitors—For the claimant, H. H. Hoare; for the Minister for Trading Concerns, Western Australia, F. L. Stow, Crown Solicitor for Western Australia; for the interveners, Gordon H. Castle, Crown Solicitor for the Commonwealth, J. V. Tillett, Crown Solicitor for New South Wales, F. W. Richards, Crown Solicitor for South Australia, A. Banks-Smith, Crown Solicitor for Tasmania.] H. V. E.

FULL COURT — (Knox, C.J.,
Isaacs and Rich, JJ.)
(Sydney.)

Nov. 18, 19.

SYMES v. STEWART.

Licensing—"Supply" of liquor to intoxicated person—Liquor bought and handed back to licensee for safe custody—Returned to purchaser when intoxicated—"Liquor Act 1912" (N.S.W.), sec. 53.

Section 53 of the "Liquor Act 1912" (N.S.W.) makes it an offence for a licensee to "supply" liquor to any person who is at the time in a state of intoxication. A man went into the hotel of the appellant in the morning and purchased and paid for a bottle of whisky. The bottle was handed to the man, who gave it back to the appellant to be kept for him until later in the day. He was then sober. The bottle was wrapped up and put on a shelf, and was handed back to the man later in the day when he was in a state of intoxication. On a prosecution for an offence under the section,—

Held, that the appellant had "supplied" liquor to a person who was at the time in a state of intoxication, and should have been convicted.

Hall-Dalwood v. Emerson, 87 L.J. K.B. 296, applied. Judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Harvey, J.) affirmed.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES.

The appellant, George Richard Symes, was a licensee prosecuted by the respondent, Peter Stewart, for a breach of the New South Wales "Liquor Act 1912," sec. 53, which provides that—"If the holder of any licence for the sale of liquor supplies liquor to any person who is at the time in a state of intoxication he shall for the first offence be liable to a penalty of not less than two nor more than five pounds and for any subsequent offence to a penalty of not less than ten nor more than twenty pounds and in the latter case to the forfeiture of his licence."

The Magistrate held, on the facts set out in the judgment of Knox, C.J., that the return by the appellant to Lilburn of the whisky when he was in a state of intoxication did not constitute a "supply" within the meaning of sec. 53. That question of law was then referred, under the "Justices Act 1902," to the Supreme Court, which was holden for the purpose by a single Judge (Harvey, J.). Harvey, J., held that the word "supplies" in sec. 53 extends to the case of mere manual delivery, and remitted the case to the Magistrate accordingly. From that decision the appellant, pursuant to special leave, now appealed to the High Court.

Leverrier, K.C., and H. E. Manning for the appellant.

Evatt for the respondent.

The following cases were referred to:—*Hall-Dalwood v. Emerson*, 87 L.J. K.B. 296; *Ellis v. Adams*, (1920) W.N. 238; *West Surrey v. Chertsey*, (1894)